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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
These appeals concern the criminal conviction of 
Kenneth Schneider on the charge of traveling in foreign 
commerce with the intent to engage in sex with a minor 
between the ages of twelve and sixteen, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2000). They pose questions involving pre- 
and post-trial motions, evidentiary issues, and a sentencing 
issue, each of which Schneider asserts was incorrectly 
decided by the District Court. Because the District Court did 
not err or abuse its discretion, we will affirm each of these 
rulings. 
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I. 
The victim in this case was born in Russia in 1986. At 
age ten, he was sent to study ballet at the Bolshoi Academy in 
Moscow, approximately three hours from his family’s house. 
Within a year and a half, the victim’s parents owed the 
Academy just under $500 for unpaid dormitory fees. Those 
unpaid fees prevented him from continuing to attend the 
Academy. In 1998, two of the victim’s ballet teachers 
introduced Kenneth Schneider, an American lawyer who had 
lived in Moscow for many years, to the victim and his family. 
Schneider had previously been financially generous in 
supporting artists in Russia. The teachers told Schneider 
about the victim’s circumstances, and Schneider indicated 
that he might be able to help. 
One day that summer, Schneider and the instructors 
went to the victim’s house for a ballet demonstration. During 
the demonstration, one of the teachers commented to 
Schneider that the victim was very talented. After subsequent 
meetings, Schneider agreed to financially assist the victim’s 
parents so that the victim could pursue further ballet studies at 
the Academy. Schneider proposed to pay for the victim’s 
studies and housing, and extended the victim’s father a loan 
to pay the delinquent dormitory fees. Schneider, with the 
victim’s parents’ permission, had the victim live at his 
Moscow apartment, close to the Academy. The victim was 
twelve years old when he began living with Schneider during 
the week.   
At some point, Schneider began engaging in sexual 
activity with the victim. As of August 2000, Schneider and 
the victim were engaging in oral sex on Schneider’s bed 
approximately three times per week. Thereafter, Schneider 
and the victim moved to a second apartment near the 
Academy. At this point, Schneider and the victim were also 
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engaging in anal sex, with sexual activities occurring 
approximately three to four times per week. Near this time, a 
school nurse examined the victim. Schneider told the victim 
that if the nurse asked questions about the condition of the 
victim’s anus, the victim should tell her that he had been 
using a solid stick of hemorrhoid medication. Schneider told 
the victim that if anyone discovered their sexual activity, 
Schneider would go to jail and the victim would not achieve 
his goals of becoming a famous ballet dancer or going to 
America. Around this time, Schneider showed the victim a 
movie about a famous male ballet dancer and his older male 
mentor and lover, and compared their relationship to the one 
in the film. 
In 2001, when the victim was fifteen, he, with 
assistance from Schneider, applied to and was accepted into a 
summer ballet program in Philadelphia. The victim’s parents 
agreed to let him attend. The victim and Schneider traveled 
together to Philadelphia, where the victim resided at 
Schneider’s parents’ home while attending the program. 
Schneider did not stay in Philadelphia the entire time, as he 
was traveling for work. During this time in the United States, 
Schneider and the victim held hands, hugged, and kissed on 
the lips, but no oral or anal sex occurred. On August 22, 
2001, Schneider and the victim returned together to Moscow. 
Upon their return, the victim returned to living at 
Schneider’s apartment, and Schneider and the victim resumed 
engaging in oral and anal sex. When the victim was sixteen, 
Schneider and the victim moved to Massachusetts, where the 
victim attended school and danced professionally. In 2008, 
the victim filed a civil complaint against Schneider and 
members of Schneider’s family, among others, alleging that 
Schneider had sexually abused the victim for years.  
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That civil suit was stayed in December 2009 when 
Schneider was charged in a criminal complaint. In January 
2010, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against 
Schneider, charging him with traveling in foreign commerce 
for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with 
another person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2000), 
and transporting an individual in foreign commerce with 
intent that such individual engage in a sexual activity for 
which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (2000). These charges related 
to the victim and Schneider’s travel from Philadelphia to 
Moscow on August 22, 2001. On March 27, 2010, Schneider 
was arrested in Cyprus. After two days in custody, he was 
released on bail, and subsequently returned to custody just 
under two months later, on May 17, 2010. On May 28, 2010, 
Schneider was brought to the Federal Detention Center in 
Philadelphia, remaining there through his trial. 
The trial commenced on September 21, 2010. On 
October 1, 2010, a jury found Schneider guilty on both 
counts. Schneider subsequently moved for a judgment of 
acquittal, which the District Court granted as to the § 2421 
count, but not the § 2423(b) count. Schneider was sentenced 
on December 1, 2011, to the statutory maximum fifteen 
years’ incarceration, in addition to three years’ supervised 
release, a $20,000 fine, and $35,000 in restitution. Schneider 
timely appealed. On August 12, 2012, Schneider filed a 
timely motion for a new trial based on newly-discovered 
evidence. The District Court denied this motion on February 
15, 2013, and Schneider timely appealed. Those appeals have 
been consolidated before us. 
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
III. 
Schneider raises six issues on appeal. First, did the 
District Court err when it denied Schneider’s motion for a 
judgment of acquittal for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423(b)? Second, did the District Court err when it denied 
Schneider’s motion to dismiss the indictment as barred by the 
statute of limitations? Third, did the District Court abuse its 
discretion in ruling evidence of Schneider’s pretrial 
incarceration inadmissible? Fourth, did the District Court 
abuse its discretion in admitting excerpts of and testimony 
regarding a film into evidence? Fifth, did the District Court 
abuse its discretion when it did not grant a motion for a new 
trial based on newly-discovered evidence? Finally, did the 
District Court err when it invoked a Sentencing Guidelines 
cross-reference to calculate Schneider’s final offense level? 
We consider each issue in turn. 
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A. 
Schneider, in a post-trial motion, sought a judgment of 
acquittal on both counts. App. at 18. The District Court 
granted this motion in part, writing that the “innocent round 
trip” exception established in Mortensen v. United States, 322 
U.S. 369 (1944), a prosecution under the Mann Act, ch. 395, 
36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2421-2424 (2012)), applied to the 18 U.S.C. § 2421 
conviction. It went on to deny Schneider a judgment of 
acquittal in connection with his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 
2423(b), stating that the Mortensen exception did not apply to 
that conviction. Schneider appeals the latter ruling. 
“An appeal from a denial of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal is subject to [de novo] review, where the question is 
one of statutory interpretation.” United States v. Schneider, 14 
F.3d 876, 878 (3d Cir. 1994). We will affirm if “after viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, 
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United 
States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 424-25 (3d Cir. 
2013) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1. Mann Act precedent’s application to 18 U.S.C. § 
2423(b) 
Schneider argues on appeal that application of the 
“innocent round trip” exception, first set out in Mortensen, 
should result in a reversal of the District Court’s denial of his 
motion for a judgment of acquittal on the § 2423(b) charge. 
Whether Mann Act precedent applies to prosecutions under 
§ 2423(b) is an issue of first impression in this Circuit.  
“The statutory antecedents of § 2423(b) date back to 
the Mann Act, enacted in 1910. Section 2423 evolved from 
the same legislative initiative as the Mann Act, and both are . 
. . components of the same general legislative framework.” 
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United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th 
Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “Section 2421 is the original 
Mann Act, as amended in minor respects. . . . Section 
2423(b), the provision under which the defendant was 
prosecuted, was added to expand the protection of minors still 
further; it punishes travel in interstate commerce even if no 
minor is transported, if the purpose of the travel is sex with a 
minor.” United States v. McGuire, 627 F.3d 622, 624 (7th 
Cir. 2010).  
In 1997, the Seventh Circuit noted that “[j]udicial 
interpretations of the Mann Act necessarily color our reading 
of § 2423(b).” United States v. Vang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069 
(7th Cir. 1997). It concluded that: 
[Section] 2423(b) and the Mann Act are part of 
the same general legislative framework. More 
importantly, the crucial language of § 2423(b) 
employs the same “for the purpose of” phrase 
used in the original Mann Act and construed by 
the Supreme Court and a number of lower 
courts. . . . [Furthermore, t]he familial 
relationship between § 2423(b) and the Mann 
Act suggests that Congress intended the same 
meaning for identical phrases in the two 
statutes. 
 
Id. at 1069, 1070 n.6. The Fifth Circuit has noted that “early 
cases interpreting the original Mann Act are authoritative in 
construing § 2423(b).” Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d at 220 n.3. 
We agree, so we proceed on the basis that Mann Act 
precedent such as Mortensen is instructive and persuasive in § 
2423(b) cases. 
2. The “innocent round trip” exception to the Mann Act 
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Next, we consider whether the Mortensen “innocent 
round trip” exception should be extended from prosecutions 
under § 2421 to those under § 2423(b). Mortensen involved a 
husband and wife who jointly operated a “house of 
prostitution” in Grand Island, Nebraska. 322 U.S. at 372. In 
1940, they planned a car trip to Salt Lake City, Utah, to visit 
the wife’s parents. Id. Two women who were employed by 
the Mortensens as prostitutes “asked to be taken along for a 
vacation and the Mortensens agreed to their request.” Id. On 
this vacation, they drove to and visited Yellowstone National 
Park and Salt Lake City. They visited Mrs. Mortensen’s 
parents, went to shows and parks, and visited other parts of 
the city. Id. Upon completing the trip, they all returned 
together to Grand Island, where the two women subsequently 
returned to working as prostitutes. Id. Importantly, “[n]o acts 
of prostitution or other immorality occurred during the two-
week trip and there was no discussion of such acts during the 
course of the journey.” Id. The women were not obligated to 
return to Grand Island to work for the Mortensens and were 
free at any time to leave their jobs for other pursuits. Id. at 
372-73. 
The Mortensens were subsequently charged with two 
violations of the Mann Act—that they “aided and assisted in 
obtaining transportation for and in transporting, two girls in 
interstate commerce from Salt Lake City to Grand Island for 
the purpose of prostitution and debauchery.” Id. at 373. The 
Supreme Court noted that any “intention that the women or 
girls shall engage in the conduct outlawed by [the Mann Act] 
must be found to exist before the conclusion of the interstate 
journey and must be the dominant motive of such interstate 
movement. And the transportation must be designed to bring 
about such result.” Id. at 374. It ultimately held that the trip 
was not taken with such an intent, but rather that “[i]t was a 
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complete break or interlude in the operation of petitioners’ 
house of ill fame and was entirely disassociated therefrom.” 
Id. at 375. In a crucial section of the opinion, the Supreme 
Court wrote that: 
The fact that the two girls actually resumed 
their immoral practices after their return to 
Grand Island does not, standing alone, operate 
to inject a retroactive illegal purpose into the 
return trip to Grand Island. Nor does it justify 
an arbitrary splitting of the round trip into two 
parts so as to permit an inference that the 
purpose of the drive to Salt Lake City was 
innocent while the purpose of the homeward 
journey to Grand Island was criminal. The 
return journey under the circumstances of this 
case cannot be considered apart from its integral 
relation with the innocent round trip as a whole. 
There is no evidence of any change in the 
purpose of the trip during its course. If innocent 
when it began it remained so until it ended. 
Guilt or innocence does not turn merely on the 
direction of travel during part of a trip not 
undertaken for immoral ends. 
 
Id. This language gave birth to what has become known as 
the “innocent round trip” exception to § 2421. See, e.g., 
Forrest v. United States, 363 F.2d 348, 350 n.1 (5th Cir. 
1966); United States v. Nichol, 323 F.2d 633, 634 (7th Cir. 
1963). Schneider invokes this exception here and argues that 
it should apply to his conviction under § 2423(b). In the end, 
we need not determine whether the exception is a feature of 
§ 2423(b) cases because, even if it is, Schneider’s conduct 
would not fall within it. 
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3. The exception’s application to Schneider’s conviction 
We turn, then, to the question of whether Schneider’s 
conviction could qualify for the “innocent round trip” 
exception. The modern-day version of the Mann Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 2421, states that “[w]hoever knowingly transports 
any individual in . . . foreign commerce . . . with intent that 
such individual engage in . . . any sexual activity for which 
any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or 
attempts to do so, shall be [fined or imprisoned, or both].” 18 
U.S.C. § 2421 (2000). On the other hand, the statute under 
which Schneider was convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), states 
that “a United States citizen . . . who travels in foreign 
commerce . . . for the purpose of engaging in any sexual act 
(as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of 
age that would be in violation of chapter 109A . . . shall be 
[fined, imprisoned, or both].” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2000). As 
applicable to Schneider, one of the sexual acts defined in § 
2246 that would be in violation of chapter 109A is an adult 
knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a minor between the 
ages of twelve and sixteen years old who is at least four years 
younger than the adult. 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (2000). 
Schneider argues that § 2421 and § 2423(b) use similar 
language and have been interpreted in parallel; therefore, he 
contends, the District Court erred when it found the “innocent 
round trip” exception a basis for a judgment of acquittal on 
the § 2421 transport charge but not on the § 2423(b) travel 
charge. 
We disagree. As an initial matter, we decline 
Schneider’s invitation to compare his two counts of 
conviction. The District Court’s disposition of Schneider’s 
conviction under § 2421 is not before us, and therefore we do 
not comment on it. 
12 
 
Though Mortensen uses the language of a “dominant” 
purpose, our sister Circuits have held that “[i]t suffices if one 
of the efficient and compelling purposes in the mind of the 
accused in the particular transportation was [illegal sexual] 
conduct.” United States v. Campbell, 49 F.3d 1079, 1082 (5th 
Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Vang, 
128 F.3d at 1072. This is because the statement in Mortenson 
that the immoral purpose must be the defendant’s most 
significant motivation has long been held to be dictum. “It 
now appears settled that . . . immoral conduct, need not be the 
sole reason for the transportation; the Act may be violated if 
[immoral conduct] is a dominant or a compelling and efficient 
purpose. Despite the contrary implication suggested by the 
word ‘dominant,’ it need not be the most important of 
defendant’s reasons when multiple purposes are present.” 
United States v. Snow, 507 F.2d 22, 24 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(footnotes omitted); accord United States v. Lebowitz, 676 
F.3d 1000, 1014-15 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Miller, 
148 F.3d 207, 212 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Tyler, 424 
F.2d 510, 512 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Bennett, 364 
F.2d 77, 78-79 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1966); Nunnally v. United 
States, 291 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1961); Bush v. United 
States, 267 F.2d 483, 485 (9th Cir. 1959); Daigle v. United 
States, 181 F.2d 311, 314 (1st Cir. 1950); Mellor v. United 
States, 160 F.2d 757, 764 (8th Cir. 1947). Thus, resuming 
sexual contact with the victim need not be Schneider’s only 
or most important purpose for a jury to convict him of 
violating § 2423(b).  
Several facts directly link Schneider’s travel from 
Russia to the United States and back with his desire to 
continue a sexually abusive relationship with the victim. The 
victim and Schneider’s relationship was, from the outset, 
grounded in Schneider’s promise that he would “make [the 
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victim] a star,” which was the victim’s father’s dream. App. 
at 274.  Further, from their very first meeting, Schneider had 
discussed with the victim his “interest[] in going to America.” 
App. at 567-68. The victim was “interested about [sic] 
America” and “interested in going to America to study and, 
perhaps, to have a career.” App. at 580-81. Schneider only 
had access to the victim because he was able to help him stay 
enrolled in a prestigious ballet academy and provide the 
resources to help propel the victim’s ballet career. With this 
trip, Schneider was providing the victim with an exciting 
overseas excursion as part of Schneider’s promise to propel 
his ballet career forward.  
Thus, the trip to Philadelphia was a critical component 
of Schneider’s scheme to sexually abuse the victim; it was not 
a “complete break or interlude” in the illicit activities. See 
Mortensen, 322 U.S. at 375. The trip was not an “innocent” 
recreational trip or vacation that may have had the incidental 
effect of currying favor with the victim and therefore is 
distinguishable from Mortensen and the other cases where the 
innocent round trip exception has been applied. See, e.g., 
United States v. Ross, 257 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1958) (defendant 
and prostitute took weekend recreational trips from New 
York to New Jersey); Oriolo v. United States, 324 U.S. 824 
(1945) (per curiam) (defendant and prostitute took 
recreational trip to Atlantic City). Because the trip was part of 
Schneider’s calculated plan to manipulate and abuse the 
victim, the Mortensen exception is inapplicable. 
The “verdict must be assessed from the perspective of 
a reasonable juror, and the verdict must be upheld as long as 
it does not fall below the threshold of bare rationality.” 
Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d at 431 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). “Unless the jury’s conclusion is irrational, it 
must be upheld. In our role as reviewers, we must resist the 
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urge to hypothetically insert ourselves into the jury room for 
deliberations.” Id. at 432. Reviewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the prosecution, based on the facts and 
testimony described above, a rational jury could conclude that 
one of Schneider’s efficient and compelling purposes of the 
trip from Moscow to Philadelphia and back was to further 
Schneider’s sexually abusive relationship with the victim by 
continuing to lay the groundwork for the victim’s dependence 
on Schneider. This conclusion disqualifies Schneider from the 
protection provided by the “innocent round trip” exception. 
We will affirm the District Court’s denial of 
Schneider’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. 
B. 
Before trial, Schneider moved to dismiss the 
indictment as barred by a five-year statute of limitations. The 
District Court denied this motion, holding that the indictment 
was timely under 18 U.S.C. § 3283, a special provision 
extending the statute of limitations for offenses involving the 
sexual abuse of a child. We review de novo the denial of a 
motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds. United 
States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 168 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 Schneider was indicted on January 14, 2010. The 
general statute of limitations is five years after the offense is 
committed. 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Because the offense with 
which Schneider was charged occurred on August 22, 2001, 
he argues that § 3282 bars his prosecution. The Government 
argues that the statute of limitations does not apply because 
the version of 18 U.S.C. § 3283 in effect at the time of the 
offense expressly provided that “[n]o statute of limitations 
that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense 
involving the sexual . . .  abuse of a child under the age of 18 
years shall preclude such prosecution before the child reaches 
the age of 25 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2000). Thus, because 
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the victim was under twenty-five years old at the time of the 
prosecution, we must determine whether the offense with 
which Schneider was charged “involve[ed] the sexual . . . 
abuse of a child.” 
The extension of the statute of limitations for offenses 
“involving the sexual . . . abuse of a child under the age of 18 
years” in § 3283 was originally codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
3509(k) as part of the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990), and later transferred verbatim 
to § 3283. There, “sexual abuse” is defined as including the 
“employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or 
coercion of a child to engage in . . . the rape, molestation, 
prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children.” 
18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8). 
Schneider argues that this extension of the statute of 
limitations cannot apply to an offense under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423(b) because § 2423(b) merely “criminalizes interstate 
travel for an illicit purpose,” United States v. Tykarsky, 446 
F.3d 458, 469 (3d Cir. 2006), and does not require that any 
action be taken that “involv[es] the sexual . . . abuse of a 
child,” 18 U.S.C. § 3283. The statute on its face does not 
require any actual illicit sexual conduct, but merely travel 
with the intent to engage in such conduct. Schneider therefore 
contends that by this plain reading, the sexual abuse of a child 
is not an “essential ingredient” of the offense of conviction. 
In support, Schneider analogizes to Bridges v. United 
States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953). In that case, the Supreme Court 
examined the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act 
(“WSLA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3287, which applied to offenses 
“involving the defrauding of the United States,” Bridges, 346 
U.S. at 215. The United States had charged the petitioner with 
making a false statement in his application for naturalization. 
Id. at 213. The Court had to determine whether such conduct 
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“involv[ed] the defrauding of the United States,” much as we 
here must determine whether Schneider’s conduct “involv[ed] 
the sexual . . . abuse of a child.” The Court stated that 
Congress, in passing the WSLA, “was concerned with the 
exceptional opportunities to defraud the United States that 
were inherent in its gigantic and hastily organized 
procurement program. It sought to help safeguard the treasury 
from such frauds by increasing the time allowed for their 
discovery and prosecution.” Id. at 218. As a result, the Court 
held that the WSLA did not apply to the offense of knowingly 
making a false statement under oath in a naturalization 
proceeding because “fraud is not an essential ingredient” of it. 
Id. at 222. 
Schneider urges that we adopt a similar “essential 
ingredient” test in this case and rule that because sexual abuse 
is not an essential ingredient of a violation of § 2423(b), the 
statute of limitations remains at five years. He notes that a 
violation of § 2423(b) requires neither an actual child nor 
actual abuse, that Congress has not evinced a clear intent in § 
3283 to eliminate the statute of limitations for “bad intent” 
crimes, and that statutes of limitations are to be “liberally 
interpreted in favor of repose.” Toussie v. United States, 397 
U.S. 112, 115 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
We disagree. We hold that a violation of § 2423(b) for 
“travel[ing] in foreign commerce . . . for the purpose of 
engaging in any sexual act . . . with a person under 18 years 
of age that would be in violation of chapter 109A,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423(b) (2000), involves the sexual abuse of a person under 
age 18. At the time of the offense, chapter 109A made it a 
crime to knowingly engage in a sexual act with a person 
between the age of twelve and sixteen years if the offender 
was more than four years older than the minor. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2243(a). 
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Schneider’s reliance on Bridges is inapposite. While 
Bridges did adopt an “essential ingredient” test, the 
limitations-extending statute at issue was a narrowly drafted 
exception specifically intended to target frauds related to war 
procurement. Unlike the WSLA, § 3283 has no such 
restrictive language or legislative history suggesting 
congressional intent to limit its application to a specific subset 
of circumstances. Congress, rather, has evinced a general 
intention to “cast a wide net to ensnare as many offenses 
against children as possible.” United States v. Dodge, 597 
F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The District 
Court’s ruling is consonant with, not contrary to, that intent. 
In particular, Schneider’s conduct “involves sexual 
abuse” as contemplated by § 3283. Schneider was convicted 
of traveling with the purpose of engaging in sex with the 
victim, a minor. The victim testified that before the trip to 
Philadelphia, he and Schneider engaged in oral and anal sex 
three to four times per week; that upon returning to Moscow 
the sexual activities between Schneider and the victim 
resumed and continued to occur two to three times per week; 
and that Schneider engaged in psychological manipulation, 
urging the victim to keep Schneider’s conduct secret, conceal 
any physical injuries, and stay away from girls. 
Sexual abuse includes the “persuasion, inducement, 
enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in . . . sexually 
explicit conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) (2000). Sexual 
abuse as defined here encompasses a wider set of behavior 
than just rape or other unwanted sexual touching. Schneider 
agreed to sponsor the victim on the basis of his talent, paid for 
the victim’s ballet academy fees, had the victim move into his 
apartment where he raped and sexually abused him 
repeatedly, and traveled with the victim to the United States 
so that the victim could attend a prestigious summer ballet 
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school. This series of actions sufficiently involves the 
“persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to 
engage in . . . sexually explicit conduct” to invoke the longer 
statute of limitations for offenses “involving the sexual . . . 
abuse of a child.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) (2000); 18 
U.S.C. § 3283 (2000). We will affirm the District Court’s 
ruling that Schneider’s violation of § 2423(b) involves sexual 
abuse of a child. 
C. 
During his trial, Schneider sought to inform the jury 
that he had been continuously incarcerated for four to five 
months before trial, and was therefore unable to obtain 
treatment during that time for a medical condition. The 
District Court did not allow this statement because it was 
concerned with its prejudicial effect on the jury. The Court 
did allow Schneider to testify that it had been impossible for 
him to seek treatment during this period without mentioning 
his incarceration. He appeals the District Court’s evidentiary 
ruling. “We review the District Court’s decisions as to the 
admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.” United 
States v. Serafini, 233 F.3d 758, 768 n.14 (3d Cir. 2000).  
 In July 2008, Schneider learned of the victim’s 
allegations of sexual abuse, and in August 2008, the victim 
filed a civil complaint against Schneider. In November 2009, 
in connection with the civil case, the victim drew two pictures 
of Schneider’s erect penis which depict a curvature, and on 
January 22, 2010, the victim signed an affidavit in the civil 
case describing Schneider’s penis when erect, and attached 
the two drawings to the affidavit. As of January 27, 2010, the 
victim’s attorneys had provided the affidavit and drawings to 
Schneider’s attorneys. 
 On March 27, 2010, Schneider was arrested abroad. 
He was held for two days and released on bail on March 29, 
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2010. On May 17, 2010, Schneider was returned to custody, 
and on May 28, 2010, Schneider was brought to the Federal 
Detention Center in Philadelphia, where he was held through 
the trial. On August 4, 2010, while Schneider was detained, 
Dr. Victor Carpiniello, an expert urologist, examined 
Schneider’s erect penis. 
 Dr. Carpiniello testified that the victim’s description 
and drawings of Schneider’s erect penis were consistent with 
a condition known as Peyronie’s disease. This disease is 
caused by a formation of plaque, or hard fibrous tissue, on the 
penile shaft, which causes abnormal curvature. The curvature 
resulting from Peyronie’s disease is mainly treated by 
surgical removal of the plaque, but potentially also by 
“injectable collagenase, radiation, oral vitamin E, topical 
vitamin E, Verapamil, Interferon Alpha 2B, iontoforesis and 
electro corporeal shock wave therapy,” none of which are 
likely to leave scarring. App. at 984-85. Dr. Carpiniello also 
testified that when he examined Schneider, on August 4, 
2010, he determined that Schneider had a normal erection 
without curvature and noted “no scarring or evidence of a 
procedure.” App. at 969. Finally, Dr. Carpiniello noted that, 
in his opinion, Schneider does not have and never had 
Peyronie’s disease. 
 Following Dr. Carpiniello’s testimony, but prior to 
Schneider’s testimony, Schneider’s counsel informed the 
District Court that he intended to elicit testimony from 
Schneider that Schneider had been incarcerated for the prior 
four months, since May 27, 2010. The District Court 
instructed that Schneider could testify that from the date he 
went back into custody until the date of his testimony, it was 
impossible for him to seek treatment for Peyronie’s disease. 
The District Court further ruled that Schneider could not “say 
or mention anything along the lines of prison,” App. at 1315, 
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on the basis that evidence of Schneider’s incarceration would 
be unfairly prejudicial and would create sympathy for him 
with the jury. 
 Evidence may only be admitted if it is relevant; that is, 
if it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence; and . . . the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.” Fed R. Evid. 401. 
Not all relevant evidence, however, is admissible. A District 
Court “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” 
Fed. R. Evid. 403. In this context, unfair prejudice means “an 
undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Fed. 
R. Evid. 403 advisory committee’s note. Because the District 
Court allowed Schneider to testify that he could not receive 
treatment during the period from May 2010 until September 
2010, but not that he was incarcerated during this period, we 
review only the judge’s ruling prohibiting Schneider from 
commenting on his incarceration for abuse of discretion. See 
Serafini, 233 F.3d at 768 n.14. The District Court abuses its 
discretion if its decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact.” Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). “In order to justify 
reversal, a [D]istrict [C]ourt’s analysis and resulting 
conclusion must be arbitrary or irrational.” United States v. 
Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Therefore, we examine whether the District Court arbitrarily 
or irrationally weighed this evidence’s probative value against 
its danger of unfair prejudice. 
1. Probative value 
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Schneider contends that this testimony holds probative 
value because it supports his argument to the jury that his 
penis did not match the victim’s drawings and description, 
thus undermining a key piece of the evidence. He states that 
the facts that he was unable to receive treatment prior to the 
expert examination due to his incarceration and that the 
expert’s testimony was that his penis—examined while 
incarcerated—did not match the victim’s drawings and 
descriptions, support his argument that the victim did not 
have knowledge of what his penis looked like, and that 
Schneider therefore did not have sexual contact with the 
victim. Schneider contends that this adverse ruling “made it 
far more likely [that he] would be convicted on these charges 
by excluding compelling evidence that [the victim] had 
fabricated his claims of sexual abuse.” Appellant’s Br. at 47. 
Schneider overstates the probative value of this 
testimony, as he had the ability to alter his penile condition 
prior to his ultimate incarceration before trial. Schneider first 
learned of the victim’s accusations of sexual abuse in August 
2008, eighteen months before he was initially arrested, and 
first learned of the victim’s affidavit and drawings by January 
27, 2010, two months before he was arrested. Furthermore, 
Schneider was free on bail for six weeks from March 29, 
2010 to May 17, 2010. Because Schneider had multiple 
periods to receive treatment before he was incarcerated, the 
fact that he could not receive treatment in the months leading 
up to the trial has little probative value to the crucial issue of 
the victim’s familiarity with Schneider’s penis. In addition, 
because Schneider was permitted to mention that he could not 
receive treatment during the pre-trial period, the incremental 
probative value of mentioning his incarceration is low. 
2. Potential for unfair prejudice 
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Schneider argues that allowing him to make this 
statement would have presented little potential for unfair 
prejudice. Schneider contends that “any general inclination to 
exclude from evidence the fact of a criminal defendant’s 
pretrial incarceration is to protect the defendant, not the 
prosecution, from unfair prejudice.” Appellant’s Br. at 47-48. 
We disagree. While this argument is facially plausible, it is 
supported by no citation to any case law or secondary 
authority. See Appellant’s Br. at 47-48. Nor do the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, either in their text or in the advisory 
committee’s notes, contain any instruction or indication that 
evidence of incarceration is inadmissible if the defendant 
would be prejudiced, but admissible if the prosecution would 
be prejudiced. 
The Government, on the other hand, argues that 
allowing Schneider to testify in this manner holds great 
potential for unfair prejudice. It contends that Schneider 
sought to stir sympathy with the jury, and identifies other 
cases where evidence was ruled inadmissible due to its 
potential to induce sympathy for the defendant in the jury. See 
United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Pintado-Isiordia, 448 F.3d 1155, 1158 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (per curiam). When a District Court decides 
whether evidence, such as Schneider’s testimony, is 
admissible, it must weigh the probative value of the testimony 
with the potential for unfair prejudice. Only when the 
probative value is “substantially outweighed” by the potential 
for unfair prejudice is the evidence inadmissible. Schneider’s 
testimony on incarceration has little probative value, but the 
potential for unfair prejudice is real. The District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in making this judgment.  
We therefore will affirm the District Court’s ruling on 
this issue. 
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D. 
 At trial, the victim testified that Schneider showed him 
the film Nijinsky, which told the story of Vaslav Nijinsky, a 
ballet dancer in the early 1900s, and his older patron and 
lover, Sergei Diaghilev. The District Court admitted into 
evidence excerpts of the film which depict Diaghilev kissing 
Nijinsky, Nijinsky performing in a ballet that includes an act 
of simulated masturbation, and Nijinsky marrying a woman 
and becoming mentally ill. At various points, the Court also 
allowed the introduction of other testimony regarding a 
birthday card, porcelain figurines of faun-like creatures, 
payment for goods, and Schneider’s psychological 
relationship with the victim. 
 After the trial, Schneider moved for a new trial due to 
the introduction of unduly prejudicial evidence, claiming that 
evidence relating to Count Two, upon which Schneider was 
ultimately granted a judgment of acquittal, prejudicially 
spilled over to the jury’s assessment of Count One. The 
District Court ruled that while it committed error in admitting 
the evidence because it was unduly prejudicial, the 
introduction of the evidence was harmless. Schneider argues 
that the District Court erred, while the United States argues 
that the District Court properly admitted the evidence as 
intrinsic, and that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, or 
the error, if any, was harmless. 
We review the District Court’s decision for an abuse of 
discretion. United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 
2001). If we find that the District Court abused its discretion, 
we review de novo whether that error was prejudicial or 
harmless. United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 317-18 (3d 
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Cir. 2002).1 An error is harmless when it is “highly probable 
that it did not prejudice the outcome.” Id. at 318 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). “While the Government bears the 
burden of showing that the error was harmless, we can affirm 
for any reason supported by the record.” Id. at 326 (citation 
omitted). 
“In practice, therefore, prejudicial spillover analysis . . . 
begins by asking whether any of the evidence used to prove 
the [count on which the defendant was acquitted] would have 
been inadmissible to prove the remaining count. . . . [I]f the 
answer is ‘yes,’ then we must consider whether the verdict on 
the remaining count was affected adversely by the evidence 
that would have been inadmissible at a trial limited to that 
count.” Id. at 318. If all evidence on the discarded counts 
would remain admissible to prove the remaining count, our 
inquiry ends. Id. 
As already noted, a court may exclude relevant 
evidence if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. 
Schneider argues that the Nijinsky excerpts were inadmissible 
to prove Count One because they “included sexual content 
unrelated to the charges in this case,” were “extremely 
prejudicial,” and were “compelling and emotional.” 
Appellant’s Br. at 50-51, 53, 64. He contends that the 
prosecutor “was permitted to show the jury highly prejudicial 
excerpts from that film that portrayed the older Diaghilev 
                                              
1 The error alleged here is not of constitutional 
dimension. If it were, it could only be called “harmless” if we 
could say that, beyond reasonable doubt, it did not contribute 
to the verdict. See Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 
(2003). 
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seducing and then controlling the much younger Nijinsky,” 
Appellant’s Br. at 53, which was admitted solely to establish 
the victim’s dependence on Schneider, a unique element of 
Count Two—a count on which Schneider was later granted a 
judgment of acquittal. In support, he notes that when the 
attorneys were discussing the admissibility of the Nijinsky 
excerpts at trial, the prosecutor stated that “[i]t shows his . . . 
control over the victim and the psychological inference.” 
App. at 481. Furthermore, in her closing argument, the 
prosecutor mentioned the Nijinsky evidence as supporting an 
element of Count Two which was not required in Count 
One—compulsion. App. at 1625-26. Finally, ruling on the 
motion for a new trial after Schneider’s conviction, the 
District Court wrote that it “agree[d that] excerpts of the film 
were unduly prejudicial inasmuch as they included sexual 
content unrelated to the charges in this case.” App. at 49. 
This argument is unpersuasive. The Nijinsky evidence 
is admissible as evidence intrinsic to Count One. Rule 404(b) 
“does not apply to evidence of uncharged offenses committed 
by a defendant when those acts are intrinsic to the proof of 
the charged offense.” Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 189 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). “[A]cts are intrinsic when they 
directly prove the charged [offense].” Cross, 308 F.3d at 320 
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Even if the evidence is 
‘extremely prejudicial to the defendant,’ ‘the court would 
have no discretion to exclude it because it is proof of the 
ultimate issue in the case.’” Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 189 
(quoting United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 218 (3d Cir. 
1999)). For example, the fact that Schneider showed the 
victim the movie and told him that he should not leave 
Schneider in the way that Nijinsky left Diaghilev made it 
more likely that Schneider and the victim had a sexual 
relationship before the trip to Philadelphia, which 
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consequently made it more likely that Schneider intended to 
resume a sexual relationship upon returning to Moscow. 
Furthermore, the other evidence of Schneider’s prolonged 
psychological entanglement with the victim also directly 
proved the crime charged in Count One because it spoke to 
Schneider’s purpose in traveling back to Russia—a key 
component of his ultimate conviction. 
Because the conduct was intrinsic to Count One, 
Cross, 308 F.3d at 320, and the District Court’s initial 
evidentiary ruling was not “clearly contrary to reason,” Butch, 
256 F.3d at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted), we hold 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the motion for a new trial. More specifically, we hold that 
Nijinsky evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence, in 
contrast to the District Court deeming its admission erroneous 
as unfairly prejudicial, but ultimately harmless. “[W]e can 
affirm for any reason supported by the record,” Cross, 308 
F.3d at 326, and we do so in this instance. Though we base 
our decision on a different ground, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of a motion for a new trial on this issue. 
E. 
Schneider appeals the District Court’s denial of his 
motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 33(b)(1). Schneider claims he discovered new 
evidence in connection with the ongoing civil suit that the 
victim is pursuing against him “strongly suggest[ing] perjury 
by [the victim] at trial and a significant Brady violation.” 
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Appellant’s Br. at 64-65.2 The District Court did not grant an 
evidentiary hearing on the matter and denied Schneider’s 
motion for a new trial. We review the District Court’s denial 
of a motion for a new trial for abuse of discretion. United 
States v. Salahuddin, 765 F.3d 329, 346 (3d Cir. 2014). 
In order to succeed on a motion for a new trial based 
on newly-discovered evidence, the defendant carries the 
burden of establishing five elements: 
(a) [T]he evidence must be in fact newly 
discovered, i.e.[,] discovered since trial; (b) 
facts must be alleged from which the court may 
infer diligence on the part of the movant; (c) the 
evidence relied on must not be merely 
cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be 
material to the issues involved; and (e) it must 
be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new 
trial, the newly discovered evidence would 
probably produce an acquittal. 
 
United States v. Quiles, 618 F.3d 383, 388-89 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
1. Newly-discovered Brady violation 
Schneider first asserts that he should be granted a new 
trial based on a newly-discovered violation of the rule in 
                                              
2 We have granted a motion to seal portions of the 
appendix filed in this case. In this section, we find it 
necessary to include some of the sealed information, but have 
revealed it in such a way as to carry out the intent and 
purpose of the motion to seal. 
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Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). “To establish a due 
process violation under Brady, then, a defendant must show 
that: (1) evidence was suppressed; (2) the suppressed 
evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) the suppressed 
evidence was material either to guilt or to punishment.” 
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Schneider’s basis for his 
claim is that the victim testified in a deposition in his civil 
case that he was paid for his testimony in the criminal case—
payments that were undisclosed to the defense. While 
ordinarily this would raise a red flag, see, e.g., United States 
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683-84 (1985) (holding that there 
was a Brady violation when federal prosecutors withheld 
evidence of inducements made to witnesses to encourage 
them to testify against the defendant), in this case these 
revelations are insufficient to establish a Brady violation or 
other grounds for a new trial. In the victim’s deposition, the 
following exchange occurred: 
Q: Okay. Did you ever get witness vouchers 
from the government for testifying? 
A: What is witness vouchers? 
Q: I’m asking you. Do you know what they are? 
A: I was paid for testifying. 
Q: How did you get paid? 
A: Michelle, Mrs. Morgan3 went with me to the 
place to withdraw money. 
. . .  
                                              
3 Assistant U.S. Attorney Michelle Morgan-Kelly. 
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Q: Did she go over to the place like to cash a 
check and she’d give them a slip of paper, 
they’d give you money? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And who was the slip of paper from? 
A: From Michelle Morgan Kelly. [sic] 
 
App. at 2353. 
 
Schneider cannot carry his burden based on this 
testimony. First, he has not established that the evidence was 
undisclosed under Brady or that it was newly-discovered 
under Rule 33. The witness fees and per diem stipends that 
the victim was paid are required by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 
1821. Furthermore, the payments were disclosed on the 
second day of trial—and two days before the victim 
testified—in an email from an Assistant United States 
Attorney to Schneider’s trial counsel, who responded that he 
did not intend to cross-examine the victim on it. Nor can 
Schneider establish that the payment of fees was favorable to 
the defense (the second Brady element) because the victim, 
an alleged crime victim, was paid via statutorily-mandated 
vouchers, unlike the witness in United States v. Bagley, who 
was paid in cash as a cooperating informant in exchange for 
information. 473 U.S. at 683. The District Court “[found] 
Schneider’s argument as to the witness vouchers baseless,” 
and denied the motion for a new trial on this ground. App. at 
65.  
Therefore, we will hold that District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Schneider’s motion for a new 
trial on this basis. 
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2. Newly-discovered perjury 
 Schneider next asserts that he should be granted a new 
trial based on his discovery that the victim perjured himself in 
connection with the civil trial. The District Court rejected this 
argument, which we review for abuse of discretion. 
Salahuddin, 765 F.3d at 346. Schneider contends that here we 
should use the test from Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 
(7th Cir. 1928), to determine whether he should be granted a 
new trial. This test has three prongs:  
(a) The court is reasonably well satisfied that 
the testimony given by a material witness is 
false. (b) That without it the jury might have 
reached a different conclusion. (c) That the 
party seeking the new trial was taken by 
surprise when the false testimony was given and 
was unable to meet it or did not know of its 
falsity until after the trial. 
 
Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87-88. Not only has “[t]he Larrison test . 
. . not been adopted by this Court,” Gov’t of V.I. v. Lima, 774 
F.2d 1245, 1251 n.4 (3d Cir. 1985), but even the Seventh 
Circuit has subsequently abandoned it, United States v. 
Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Today, we 
overrule Larrison and adopt the reasonable probability test.”), 
vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). Therefore, 
we use the same five-factor test from Quiles identified above. 
618 F.3d at 388-89. 
Schneider says that he discovered “notes taken by a 
professional quoting the lone accuser saying that he 
committed perjury in relation to the same case, fears going to 
prison if found out, and is concerned that the conviction will 
be overturned.” Appellant’s Br. at 65-66. His argument fails 
at least on the fifth prong—“[the newly discovered evidence] 
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must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new trial, the 
newly discovered evidence would probably produce an 
acquittal.” Quiles, 618 F.3d at 388-89 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The evidence of this alleged perjury that 
Schneider complains of consists of the victim’s 
psychologist’s notes and summaries of sessions in May and 
June 2012. These notes and summaries describe the victim’s 
worry about minor inconsistencies in the civil case and the 
victim’s trial strategy.  
Schneider’s argument is unavailing. First, Schneider is 
unable to identify any specific alleged perjury. Further, when 
these excerpts are placed in context of the overall timeline of 
the civil case, it becomes clear that there is no perjury and 
that the victim was concerned about inaccuracies in his 
testimony about Susan Schneider,4 Kenneth Schneider’s 
sister, in a civil case deposition. As noted above, the victim 
sued Schneider, Schneider’s parents, Schneider’s siblings, 
and the Apogee Foundation5 in a civil suit. The victim was 
first deposed in connection with this suit on February 28, 
2012, where he discussed, among other things, Schneider’s 
sister. In April 2012, he spoke with his initial attorney about 
the civil case, and expressed his concerns about his testimony 
in the civil case to his psychologist in May 2012. The 
psychologist’s notes were obtained by the defense on August 
3, 2012, and turned over to the victim’s new attorneys shortly 
                                              
4 Susan Schneider was not a party to the criminal 
prosecution and did not testify in connection with the criminal 
prosecution. 
5 The Apogee Foundation is Schneider’s purported 
charitable foundation for gifted children in the fine arts. The 
victim was nominally a board member of the foundation. 
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thereafter. A few days later, the victim, through his attorneys, 
provided two points of errata to correct his February 
deposition regarding statements he previously had attributed 
to Susan Schneider. See Supp. App. at 59-69. Given this 
context, it appears that the victim’s comments to his 
psychologist concern testimony he gave about Susan 
Schneider’s comments, and do not constitute testimony that 
would rise to the level of perjury which would be “of such 
nature, as that, on a new trial, the newly discovered evidence 
would probably produce an acquittal.” Quiles, 618 F.3d at 
388-89 (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the 
psychologist’s notes are also strongly corroborative of the 
victim’s testimony at trial. They include statements about 
Schneider’s predatory and abusive relationship with the 
victim. App. at 2325. 
Because the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
when it declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on or grant 
Schneider’s motion for a new trial based on the newly-
discovered “perjury,” we will affirm the District Court’s 
ruling.  
F. 
When it sentenced Schneider, the District Court began 
by selecting United States Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”) 
§ 2A3.2 as the starting point for its offense level calculation. 
The District Court then invoked a cross-reference found in 
§ 2A3.2, which dictates that “[i]f the offense involved 
criminal sexual abuse or attempt to commit criminal sexual 
abuse (as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2241 or 2242), apply 
§ 2A3.1.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A3.2(c)(1) 
(2000). The District Court determined that Schneider’s 
offense level under § 2A3.1 was thirty-five. Schneider 
appeals the District Court’s use of the § 2A3.1 cross-
reference. 
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“We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. 
Solomon, 766 F.3d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 2014). As the first step 
in calculating the Guidelines range, a court must “[d]etermine 
the offense guideline section in Chapter Two (Offense 
Conduct) applicable to the offense of conviction (i.e., the 
offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or 
information of which the defendant was convicted).” 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a). Next, “[a]fter determining the 
appropriate offense guideline section pursuant to subsection 
(a) of this section, determine the applicable guideline range in 
accordance with § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” Id. § 1B1.2(b). 
The term “offense,” as used in the cross-reference, 
“means the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct 
under § 1B1.3.” Id. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(H). Therefore, the cross-
reference may be invoked if Schneider’s offense of 
conviction “involved . . . sexual abuse” or if Schneider’s 
relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 “involved . . . sexual abuse.” 
Id. § 2A3.2(c)(1). The District Court found that Schneider’s 
relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 “involved sexual abuse” 
sufficient to trigger the cross-reference. It is this ruling that 
Schneider appeals. 
Section 1B1.3 provides that, “[u]nless otherwise 
specified, (i) the base offense level where the guideline 
specifies more than one base offense level, (ii) specific 
offense characteristics and (iii) cross references in Chapter 
Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be 
determined on the basis of the following: 
(1)(A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, 
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, 
procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . 
. . that occurred during the commission of the 
offense of conviction, in preparation for that 
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offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid 
detection or responsibility for that offense; . . . 
[and]  
. . . 
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and 
omissions specified . . . above, and all harm that 
was the object of such acts and omissions.” 
 
Id. § 1B1.3 (emphases added). Thus, the District Court was 
correct to consider all of Schneider’s acts that occurred in 
preparation for his offense and during the commission of his 
offense, as well as all harm that resulted from those acts. 
Furthermore, “[c]onduct that is not formally charged or is not 
an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the 
determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range.” 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. background. 
Schneider’s offense was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2423(b) (2000)—foreign travel with the intent to engage in a 
sexual act with a minor between the ages of twelve and 
sixteen. The District Court provided a list of Schneider’s 
actions that were relevant to this offense and pertained to 
Schneider’s sexual relationship with the victim. First, it noted 
that Schneider was able to commit the offense because he had 
cultivated a years-long sexual relationship with the victim by 
means of sexual abuse enabled by the victim’s dependence on 
Schneider. App. at 2296. It also wrote that “Schneider 
fostered the illicit relationship through physical and 
psychological manipulation and economic threats with the 
intent of maintaining the sexual abuse until and beyond the 
time of the conduct constituting the offense of conviction.” 
Id. 
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The District Court did not err. These actions are 
relevant offense conduct that “involve sexual abuse” because 
they were “acts . . . that occurred . . . in preparation for [the] 
offense”—Schneider’s plan to travel back to Russia in order 
to continue sexually abusing the victim—and because they 
facilitated “harm that resulted from [these] acts”—
Schneider’s sexual abuse by force of the victim when he 
returned to Russia. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. We will affirm the 
District Court’s invocation of the cross-reference in U.S.S.G. 
§ 2A3.2(c)(1). 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
